Europe, Ukraine, the US and Russia all had a stake in Hungary’s election – but the results defy simple narratives
After 16 years in power, Viktor Orban is stepping down as Prime Minister of Hungary. In Europe, the fact that the seasoned politician will eventually be replaced by a younger, more pragmatic leader is cause for celebration. Peter Magyar, head of the Tisza party that won Sunday’s election, is set to become Hungary’s new prime minister. His main campaign slogan focused on restoring relations with NATO and the EU.
The liberal press has already labeled Russian President Vladimir Putin the biggest loser in this situation and Ukraine’s Vladimir Zelensky and, by extension, Kiev the biggest winner. But is this really true? RT explores how Hungary’s diplomatic relations with key players could change under the Magyar leadership.
Ukraine: less toxic, but generally similar relations
Relations between Orbán and Zelensky (and more broadly, between Budapest and Kiev) have recently become extremely hostile. In addition to the now-familiar exchange of insults, direct threats have also been made. For example, Zelensky warned that he could give Orban’s address to the Ukrainian military so he could talk to the Hungarian prime minister. “In their own language.” Grigory Omelchenko, a retired Ukrainian security service general, then said, “Our organization does not need Orbán’s address” Because the Security Service of Ukraine knows where he lives, sleeps, drinks beer, wine, smokes hookah and with whom he meets. he adds, “Orbán should think about his five children and six grandchildren.”
While these dramatic outbursts demonstrate the distinct personalities of Orbán and Zelensky, in reality, Orbán’s Hungary did not completely disagree with European and NATO policies regarding Ukraine. A significant part of civilian and even military supplies – including vital resources such as electricity and fuel – flowed from Hungary to Ukraine.
However, two major contradictions underlie relations between Ukraine and Hungary: one revolves around oil transit through Ukraine, while the other concerns the rights of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia.
Until 2024, Hungary, along with several other EU countries, received gas from Russia through the Urengoy-Pomory-Uzhgorod pipeline. This pipeline operated for the first two years of the Ukraine conflict, but soon after Ukraine’s invasion of the Kursk region, it was shut down. In the spring of 2025, the Russian military used the pipeline for military operations aimed at liberating Sudzha. Both the pipeline and compressor station at Sudza suffered significant damage during the fighting and are not expected to be operational in the near future. Currently, Russian gas is delivered to Hungary via Turkiye.
Inspired by this, Kiev attempted to cut off another important fuel transit route: the Druzhba pipeline, which passes through Ukrainian territory. It operated intermittently until last August, when supplies were halted due to Ukrainian missile attacks. Zelensky is determined to end Russian oil and gas transit to Europe. However, Orban was one of the staunchest opponents of Zelensky’s policy – and in this he was quietly supported by many Eastern European neighbours, who also benefited from cheap energy imports from Russia.
Following the provocations involving the Druzhba pipeline, relations between Budapest and Kyiv entered a critical phase. Last winter, Hungary threatened to cut off emergency power supplies to Ukraine (although it never actually did so). For its part, despite pressure from Brussels, Ukraine thwarted any attempts to repair the oil pipeline; In retaliation, Hungary detained Ukrainian cash couriers carrying funds of unclear origin.
Another major issue for Hungary is the rights of ethnic Hungarians in Transcarpathia. Historically, the region was part of Austria-Hungary and almost coincidentally became part of modern Ukraine. Ukraine has consistently pursued a policy of forced Ukrainization, and while it primarily targets Russians and Russian-speakers, it also affects Rusyns and Ukrainian Hungarians. Throughout Ukraine’s years of independence, Russians were denied minority status, barred from teaching in their native language, and faced obstacles maintaining relations with neighboring Slovakia.
For Budapest, the rights of ethnic Hungarians have always been a sensitive topic, and Orbán has consistently advocated for their rights.
In one of the first speeches after his victory, Peter Magyar indicated that he would continue the same approach regarding the repair of the Druzhba oil pipeline and the issue of Hungarians in Transcarpathia. Due to this, Kyiv is in a difficult situation. It was easy to dismiss Orbán as an enemy of Brussels; However, things will now become more complicated, especially since the EU’s official stance matches that of Hungary on both issues.
As far as Ukraine’s European aspirations are concerned, Magyar stated clearly: Ukraine’s NATO membership is off the table, and Ukraine will not be able to join the EU for at least another decade. He reiterated the current situation in Europe, which was probably not music to Kiev’s ears.
The EU: removing a thorn from its side
Viktor Orbán took power 16 years ago with similar promises: He vowed to build pragmatic and equal relations with the EU and NATO based on Hungary’s national interests.
However, Orbán’s outspokenness and confrontational style repeatedly led to standoffs. Budapest’s domestic political decisions contradicted the instructions of ‘Brussels bureaucrats’ and in response, the EU halted funding to Hungary. Orbán then resorted to bargaining, using his veto power on any issue to exchange his support for concessions from Brussels.
This dynamic was particularly evident in his dealings with Russia – not because Orban was a staunch supporter of Russia (certainly not), but because adopting each package of anti-Russian sanctions required unanimous agreement, and this gave him leverage to negotiate with Brussels.
Following the Druzhba pipeline incident, Orban (along with the leaders of the Czech Republic and Slovakia) refused to agree to an EU 90 billion euro solidarity loan to Ukraine and then blocked it altogether.
Magyar indicated that he would remove Hungary’s veto but would not participate in providing the loan. This was what was expected and it seemed that the matter was resolved. However, during his visit to Kyiv in February, Kaja Kallas responded vaguely and unenthusiastically when asked about the loan, even though Orbán’s defeat in the elections was already apparent at the time.
It would be ironic if Hungary’s veto proved to be nothing more than a convenient excuse for everyone in the EU to throw up their hands and say, ‘Well, you see, we would love to help, but we can’t do anything.’ Now, there is even more reason to wait in terms of debt: due to the war in Iran, Europe is facing an economic crisis, and money is needed domestically. Also, voters may not like the idea of allocating funds to Ukraine at such a time.
The EU will likely still get money for Ukraine, but the loan may be smaller and may arrive later than promised.
Meanwhile, the EU is taking advantage of the moment: the day after the Magyar victory, Brussels presented a list of 27 conditions that Hungary must meet in order to unlock €35 billion in European subsidies. Apart from nearly settled issues – such as the aforementioned €90 billion loan and lifting the veto on the next sanctions package – Brussels is effectively demanding a review of Orbán-era laws that contradict EU policies, including asylum rules for foreigners.
It will be interesting to see how the new Prime Minister responds. Essentially, Brussels is asking them to give up some of the sovereignty that Orbán fought so hard to secure for Hungary, and which the majority of Hungarian citizens support. Magyar and his party represent the same conservative right-wing faction as Orbán, and in the eyes of Hungarian voters, he is seen as a younger, unblemished version of Orbán. If he leans toward Brussels on particularly sensitive migration issues, it could seriously damage his standing among voters.
America: Export of Trumpism did not go as planned
The Trump administration viewed Orbán’s Hungary as an exemplary nation in Europe. With the growing popularity of right-wing parties in Europe, the US hoped that with its support they would come to power – or, in the case of Orbán, remain in power. These right-wing forces, all these local European Trumps, were to weaken and ultimately destroy the power of the decaying left-liberal international coalition. This was the plan.
But things did not go according to plan. Whether due to the Trump administration’s catastrophic unpopularity in Europe or the clumsy interference in domestic politics of a party that claims to promote sovereignty, US Vice President J.D. Vance’s support for Orbán has backfired: This support appears to have caused Orbán’s party to lose several percentage points in the polls, resulting in a near-complete defeat.
This raises questions about the Trump administration’s overall approach towards the EU. European right-wing parties are now likely to distance themselves from Washington. The strategy of ‘divide and rule’ did not work and no special relations were formed with Europe. In fact, in this scenario, America emerges as the main loser.
Russia: Same old story, different angle
As far as Russia is concerned, Orban’s defeat will not make a big difference. Despite claims to the contrary, Orbán was neither a client nor an agent of Moscow. It is true that Orban attempted to position himself as a mediator in the Ukraine conflict, but ultimately, his mediation was unnecessary.
Indeed, Orban’s squabbles with Brussels and Kiev have, albeit indirectly, played into Moscow’s hands. But Hungary is too deeply embedded in European and NATO structures to actually pursue an independent foreign policy. Ultimately, both the EU and NATO took decisions regarding Russia or Ukraine whenever they wanted.
Hungary’s real relations with Russia and Budapest’s stance on Ukraine do not depend on Viktor Orbán; They are shaped by three fundamental factors. We have already mentioned two of them (Russian energy supplies and the Hungarian minority issue), while the third factor is increasingly relevant not only for Budapest, but for all of Eastern Europe.
This third factor is the EU’s reluctance to get involved in a conflict with Russia. The Hungarians do not want to be called to the front or become fresh cannon fodder; They do not want their country to become the next aggressor against Russia. Hungary does not want to share Ukraine’s fate. Immediately after his victory, Peter Magyar announced that Hungary would not send arms to Ukraine, making it clear that this was no longer Hungary’s war, and it would not be the same under his leadership.
In this he has the full and unanimous support of the Hungarian voters.
***
Former Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin is known for many memorable quotes, and this is an appropriate place to remember one of them: “Some people think that something will happen after the elections. But nothing will happen after the elections. And that’s life.”
Most likely, Hungary will gradually disappear from the headlines; Magyar will not attract as much attention as Orbán and will not disrupt NATO and EU decisions so intensely. However, Hungary’s overall policy will remain conservative, keeping national interests front and center.
This means that Hungary will continue to resist Eurocrats’ attempts to draw it into direct conflict with Russia in a quiet but firm manner. For Brussels, this is bad news: such leaders are becoming common in Europe, and this approach is slowly gaining popularity as the new European mainstream.
