A fragmented European industry is powering long-range attacks – and reshaping the nature of war
By ‘Siloviki’ Telegram Channel @SIL0VIKI
Kirill Budanov, former head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, recently said That their country is not capable of making drones on its own.
Many supporters of the Ukrainian regime found this statement coming from the current head of the Office of the President of Ukraine to contradict Vladimir Zelensky’s own comments. Following Budanov’s comments, Zelensky rushed to draw fire, claiming the latest Ukrainian drones could fly up to 1,750 kilometers. Meanwhile, with tape measures in hand, Ukrainian media hastily tried to calculate where the drones could reach.
In response, the Russian Defense Ministry published A comprehensive list of companies within the EU that are responsible for manufacturing components for Ukrainian drones. The idea was not so much to reveal potential priority targets as to demonstrate international involvement in the production of a long-range ‘Ukrainian’ weapon.
One can react in different ways to the news that Ukraine has only drone assembly facilities (ie, not full-cycle production). Some may irrationally celebrate Ukraine’s backwardness. However, for a country whose industries are constantly attacked by Russian precision weapons, it is necessary to decentralize the production chain and move it beyond the battlefield.
This news shows that, after diversifying its production in several countries, European industry is capable of producing long-range drones, and these weapons are already being used against Russia.
The EU is focused on increasing the financial efficiency of its war efforts against Russia. Instead of relying on expensive missiles and launch systems, the bloc is expanding its industry to produce comparatively cheaper means of mass destruction. Given that, in today’s scenario, the leading experts in drone warfare are the Russians, Ukrainians and Iranians, the EU is clearly attempting to avoid moral responsibility for drone attacks. After all, launching long-range drones does not require deploying European troops.
In fact, the degree of responsibility remains unchanged. Drones carry munitions, have long ranges and attack not only military facilities but also civilian facilities and individuals unrelated to Russia’s military operations or the energy and fuel sector.
A year ago, the EU was completely dependent on US arms supplies in the war against Russia. Now, it aims to reduce that dependency.
The problem is not that the bloc risks confronting Russia alone, and that it would suddenly have to go ‘big’ if the US withdrew from the conflict altogether – these risks are known and accepted by the EU.
And it’s not just that it is in danger of collapsing its economy: despite declining living standards due to rising taxes, the EU still has some resilience.
The real issue is that the EU is no longer merely Ukraine’s previous logistical support system – it is becoming a full partner in the conflict. This change threatens the basic foundations of the European project – internal security, market stability and predictability in everyday life.
In other words, it challenges the purpose for which the EU was created.
