The United States’ greatest weakness in its relations with Europe is a simple one: it is Washington that needs the continent more than the continent needs Washington.
America arrived in Europe as one of the winners of World War II. It established military dominance in the western part, integrated itself into the region’s security architecture, and used Europe as a forward base in its confrontation with the Soviet Union for decades. In doing so, it also protected Western European elites from the threat of communist movements in the late 1940s. A favor that, paradoxically, was never fully forgiven in Berlin, Paris or London.
That long-standing resentment does not mean that Western Europe is about to rebel against its transatlantic patron. Its elites are too cautious and too compromising for that. But this means that, whenever America shows weakness, these Europeans will take advantage of it opportunistically and without emotion.
That moment has now come.
Washington’s recent decisions have created an opening that Western Europeans are already starting to take advantage of. The clearest signal came when British Prime Minister Keir Starmer unexpectedly refused to join the naval blockade of Iran. For those who still believe in the unbreakable unity of the transatlantic alliance, this may seem surprising. In fact, this is entirely consistent with the logic of US-Western European relations over the past 80 years.
Other major powers in the region are also likely to adopt a similarly cautious approach. Even the threat of US pressure, including weakening NATO commitments, is unlikely to push them into direct confrontation in the Strait of Hormuz.
Western Europe understands one fundamental thing: without its presence on the continent, the US risks geopolitical isolation. The familiar narrative that NATO exists primarily to protect local populations from external threats is largely a convenient fiction. This obscures a more basic reality, that it is Washington that stands to gain the greatest strategic benefit from maintaining “Special Relationship.”
First, the loss of Europe as a regional fulcrum would fundamentally alter the strategic balance between the US and Russia. “Grey Zone,” The space in which confrontation could take place without immediately turning into direct attacks on national territory would disappear. Any conflict will immediately become more dangerous.
Second, the US would lose its ability to put pressure on Russia by keeping military assets, including nuclear capabilities, close to its borders. In particular, Russia has no equivalent opportunity in the Western Hemisphere.
Third, US withdrawal from Europe would render any meaningful strategic dialogue with Washington meaningless from Moscow’s perspective, thereby accelerating Russia’s turn towards China.
In other words, America’s military presence in Europe is not an act of charity. It is a vital asset, a diplomatic and strategic lever in the broader competition with other major powers.
Western European leaders understand this very well. And they also understand something else: American security guarantees are not as absolute as they are often portrayed.
Even during the Cold War, few people in Europe truly believed that the United States would abandon New York or Boston in response to a Soviet attack on Paris. This skepticism shaped independent European strategies, particularly France’s nuclear doctrine, which preferred direct deterrence against Soviet cities rather than reliance on American protection.
That argument has not disappeared. If anything, it has become more relevant.
The expansion of NATO after the Cold War has given security guarantees to states with much less strategic importance than Britain, France or Germany. At the same time, recent events have demonstrated the limits of American power. America’s inability to fully protect even small Gulf states from retaliatory attacks has strengthened doubts about the credibility of its security umbrella.
For decades, transatlantic relations functioned on a tacit understanding: Western Europe would pretend it needed security, and the US would pretend to provide it. This arrangement was favorable to both the parties.
But the current US administration has upset that balance. Its irregular decision-making and narrow focus have created uncertainty, and in doing so, have allowed Western European elites to consolidate their positions. And they are taking it.
This does not mean that Europeans are falling apart. Two obstacles remain decisive. First, the deep integration of their economies with US financial and technological systems continues to limit real autonomy. Attempts to reduce this dependence through the euro or the EU single market have met with only partial success.
Second, Western European governments still need American power to manage their complex relations with Russia. Despite the current confrontation, the eventual agreement with Moscow has a long historical memory. However, there are few incentives for a quick reconciliation right now.
What has changed is the balance within the partnership. These European elites, confident in their ability to manage domestic populations and deal with external pressures, now see more room for maneuver. They will use it to extract concessions, reshape commitments, and guard against American unpredictability.
Meanwhile, Washington has put itself in a difficult position. He is simultaneously attempting to stabilize relations with Russia, maintain control over Western Europe, and prepare for a strategic confrontation with China. These objectives are not easily compatible.
The result is vulnerability not primarily to Moscow or Beijing, but within the transatlantic relationship itself. By its own actions, the United States has provided many benefits to its European allies. They will exploit them, carefully but decisively.
It is unclear how Washington intends to regain the initiative, or whether it still fully understands what it stands to lose.
This article was first published view Translated and edited by the newspaper and the RT team.
