Islamabad, Pakistan – When Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry confirmed on Monday that Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar would visit Beijing the next day, it reached out in familiar language, highlighting the long-standing ties between the two countries.
According to the ministry, the two sides will have “in-depth discussions on regional developments as well as bilateral and global issues of mutual interest”, as the two countries “enjoy an all-weather strategic cooperative partnership”.
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But Dar’s visit to China comes at a time when Islamabad is trying to calm a particularly turbulent season – not in its relations with Beijing, but in Pakistan’s neighbourhood.
Over the weekend, Islamabad hosted the foreign ministers of Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia for a quadrilateral meeting aimed at pushing the United States and Iran toward negotiations, ending a months-long war that has rapidly spread to multiple theaters across the Middle East, sending energy prices soaring and raising the risk of a global recession.
Dar’s decision to fly to China, despite medical advice to take rest after suffering a hairline shoulder fracture after slipping while receiving the Egyptian foreign minister in Islamabad on Sunday, underlines the sense of urgency within Pakistan’s diplomatic efforts.
During a call on March 27, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told Dar that Beijing appreciated Islamabad’s “tireless efforts to calm the situation.” that was the attitude repeated Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Mao Ning said China “appreciates and supports Pakistan’s mediation effort to de-escalate tensions and is willing to enhance communication and coordination with Pakistan and others to jointly work for a ceasefire and peace in the region”.
But analysts say Dar was not visiting China in search of more critical messages. At a time when US President Donald Trump oscillates daily – sometimes hourly – between promoting diplomacy and threatening military escalation against Iran, and Tehran is distrusting of Washington’s intentions, Dar’s visit, he says, will depend on the answer to a single question: Can Islamabad woo Beijing by going beyond rhetoric to play a more consequential role in the ongoing mediation efforts?
coordinating post
According to Baqir Sajjad Syed, former Pakistan fellow at the Wilson Centre, the purpose of Dar’s visit is to brief the Chinese leadership on the recently concluded Islamabad Quadrilateral.
He said the visit would also help refine five principles for potential US-Iran talks: immediate ceasefire, resumption of talks, protection of civilians, maritime security and adherence to the UN Charter.
“These principles were first discussed in the Wang Yi-Dar telephone conversation last week,” Syed told Al Jazeera. “A main objective of this visit is to translate these into a more concrete framework or outcome document. Last week’s phone call was preliminary. The personal engagement allows for more detailed coordination, possible alignment on parameters and consideration of a joint statement,” he said.
Ishtiaq Ahmed, emeritus professor at Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad, views the visit through Pakistan’s established mediating role.
“Pakistan generally takes China into confidence because China is a stable ally with a different profile from the US,” he told Al Jazeera.
Ahmed said, “This is classical arbiter behaviour, a country sometimes signaling its interests and expectations in return for facilitating others. Pakistan is trying to remain relevant and it does just that.”
Yun Sun, director of the China Program at the Stimson Center in Washington, DC, drew a sharp contrast between the diplomatic roles Islamabad and Beijing could play.
He said, “Pakistan can mediate between America and Iran.” “China cannot do this. China has made most of the calls regarding Gulf countries and Iran.”
guarantor question
One of the more notable explanations of Dar’s visit came from Vali Nasr, a former US State Department official and leading Iran expert.
“Iran demands guarantees in any deal with the US,” Nasr posted on Twitter on Monday. “There is news that Pakistan’s foreign minister is going to Beijing to seek guarantors for a possible deal. This is probably Iran’s condition for talks with the US. And the foreign minister will not go to China without consulting both Washington and Beijing. There is no guarantee that China will bite but Beijing is now at the forefront of the diplomatic effort.”
Ahmed disagreed with that premise. “The notion that Beijing will step in as a guarantor for Tehran is analytically weak,” he said.
“Guarantees are provided by strong, stable actors that seek to maintain order, not by powers that align themselves with a regime whose position is clearly weakening. Iran’s operational space has been largely limited to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and Houthi activity. No serious power, least of all China, undermines the interests of a declining actor,” he said.
The Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway between Iran and Oman, carries about a fifth of the world’s daily oil and gas supplies and has been effectively blocked since the war began on February 28 following US-Israeli strikes on Iran that killed Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other military and political leaders.
However, Saied said, given its economic ties with Iran, broadly stable relations with all parties, and its financial and diplomatic importance, Beijing is “well positioned and increasingly willing to act as a credible underwriter of this process”.
“Chinese officials clearly link Beijing’s support for Pakistan’s mediation to ‘restoring the Hormuz transit’ and ‘regional peace and stability,'” he said. “China will not remain a neutral spectator. It would like to see a stable Iran-US track to serve its core interests.”
What does China stand to gain?
Even without a guarantor role, China has clear incentives to end the conflict.
Data from tanker-tracking firm Kpler shows China will import about 1.38 million barrels of crude oil per day from Iran in 2025, about 12 percent of its total imports.
The stakes on the Strait of Hormuz are significant. According to the US Energy Information Administration, about 20 million barrels per day could flow through the strait in 2024, amounting to about 20 percent of global petroleum consumption.
The International Energy Agency estimates that about 15 million barrels per day will pass through the strait in 2025, with China and India accounting for 44 percent of imports.
Researchers at Columbia University estimate that 45 to 50 percent of China’s crude imports pass through the strait, making any disruption a direct threat to its energy security.
According to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, total China-Iran trade, including undeclared oil imports, is expected to reach approximately $41.2 billion in 2025.
In 2021, Iran and China signed a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement, under which Beijing promised to invest up to $400 billion in exchange for discounted Iranian oil. However, much of that investment has not yet materialized due to US sanctions on Chinese companies.
Syed described China’s intentions as “obvious and selfish”.
“These include safeguarding energy security, safeguarding BRI and CPEC investments across the region, and polishing its image as a global peace broker. Prolonged wars and high oil prices directly harm China’s economy,” he said.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a network of highways, railways and ports that spans more than 150 countries, while the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) – a part of the BRI – is worth about $62 billion, and connects China’s Xinjiang region with the Arabian Sea port of Gwadar.
“Islamabad’s on-the-ground shuttle diplomacy gives China a low-risk, credible face to ease tensions without direct engagement with Washington on this issue,” Syed said.
However, Ahmed views China’s stance as more cautious.
He said, “The Chinese are very pragmatic and calculating. They will assess where things are going, and at the end of the day, China would not want Iran to become Venezuela, with the Americans at its doorstep.”
“Trump, as brutal as he is, has been transparent about this, he has openly said he wants Iranian oil. Asia and Europe are being hit the hardest by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and China will feel that impact,” he said.
Syed said China could rely on economic leverage, including “trade and investment incentives or quiet pressure on Iran”, as well as diplomatic tools such as “public support, envoys, joint framework-building” to engage in dialogue while avoiding direct military involvement.
Ahmed agreed. “I don’t think China will do anything militarily. Economically, they have broader interests and they will make their expectations clear to Pakistan,” he said.
Keep an eye on Washington and Beijing
Before the US-Israeli attacks on Iran, Trump was scheduled to visit Beijing from March 31 to April 2, but he postponed the trip. The summit is now expected to take place on May 14 and 15. Chinese President Xi Jinping is also expected to visit the US at the end of the year.
Ahmed said these meetings could provide clues about broader alignment.
“There are two visits planned this year, Trump’s visit to China and Xi’s visit to the United States. If they meet twice, clearly there is some degree of understanding between the two great powers. And what you’re seeing now under Trump is, in a way, more transparency; he says what he means. That dynamic is worth watching carefully,” he said.
Meanwhile, the military situation continues to escalate. An amphibious task force of about 3,500 Marines and sailors, led by the USS Tripoli, has arrived in the Gulf. Another 2,200 Marines are deployed to the area, along with 2,000 soldiers from the US Army’s 82nd Airborne Division.
Trump has indicated military options are being considered, with reports suggesting the Pentagon is preparing for possible ground operations lasting up to a few weeks.
China’s deep calculations
Ahmed argues that China’s position is rooted in broader strategic interests.
“Ending this conflict is in China’s core interest,” he said. “Unlike the imperial powers, it has not nurtured expansionist ambitions. When China has expanded its footprint in recent years, it has done so by developing a greater stake in global stability.”
Beyond Taiwan and the South China Sea, Beijing has little desire for military involvement elsewhere, he said.
“Don’t expect China to have military ambitions elsewhere,” he said.
However, Syed argued that China could take a more proactive stance.
“A prolonged Hormuz crisis, a destabilized Iran, or a broader regional war carries direct costs for China in the form of energy shocks, disrupted shipping, and BRI risks,” he said. “China will not remain a neutral spectator.”
However, Sun, who has studied China’s involvement in conflict zones, cautioned against exaggerating Beijing’s role.
“China does not impose mediation on other countries and China needs to be aware of the potential consequences of mediation and what happens if it doesn’t work,” he said.
