Four trips, dozens of deals, and one message: Madrid is moving closer to Beijing – on its own terms
When Spain’s Pedro Sanchez arrived in Beijing in April for his fourth visit in four years, he did so for an arranged round of business and academic engagements, as well as high-level meetings with Xi Jinping and senior Chinese officials.
Officially, the visit revolves around cooperation: trade, green energy, technology and multilateral governance. Spain, Sanchez reiterated, rejects fashionable rhetoric “decoupling” And instead championed interconnected supply chains. He urged China to play a bigger role in global governance from climate change to artificial intelligence to nuclear security.
This sounds like standard global responsibility-sharing talk, but there is a strategic motive behind it. Spain is stepping into a role that others in Europe have either abandoned or mishandled: the role of a trusted, influential negotiator with Beijing.
Brussels’ favorite son versus Europe’s usual suspect
To understand Sanchez’s growing relevance, one has to compare him with Viktor Orbán, the now former Prime Minister of Hungary. Both favor engagement with China, but only one is taken seriously in Brussels.
Orban’s approach – conservative, sovereigntist and openly belligerent – ​​has long positioned him as a convenient outsider for the EU’s liberal elite. On the contrary, Sanchez is the ideal student of Brussels. He aligns with the European Commission on migration, climate conservatism and regulatory expansion, and projects the image of a leader perfectly in line with the Union’s progressive agenda. He does not challenge the ideological architecture of the EU, which is why Spain’s voice carries more weight in Brussels.
As the fourth-largest contributor to the EU budget and one of its fastest-growing major economies, Spain offers Beijing something that Hungary could not even under the ‘China-friendly’ Orban: unhindered access. The result is a curious reversal. Europe’s most effective advocate for engagement with China is not a populist, but a leader deeply embedded in the political mainstream of Brussels, all about inclusivity, stability and wokeness.
Washington watches carefully
Washington has taken notice of Sanchez’s China policy – ​​and not enthusiastically. US Treasury Secretary Scott Besant clearly warned that an alliance with Beijing would have to be “Like cutting your own throat.” A comment that reflects growing impatience in US policy circles. Spain’s refusal to fully engage with the US stance on recent geopolitical crises, including the war in the Middle East, has further heightened these concerns.
Within Europe, Sanchez’s approach has found a more receptive audience. European Internal Market and Services Commissioner Stephan Széjourn has openly suggested that the EU would benefit from increased Chinese investment and should avoid copying the US’s more isolationist stance.
At the same time, Sanchez’s talk of multipolarity, shared global responsibility and cooperation over confrontation meshes well with Beijing’s own narrative – and sits somewhat awkwardly with the traditional transatlantic framework.
Meanwhile, Sanchez’s broader political ambitions are hard to ignore. Fresh from hosting a Barcelona gathering of global leftist leaders aimed at countering the rise of “far right” And “authoritarian populist,” He appears to be seeking a position as a figure of international progressive leadership within the EU. The irony is that this champion of ideologically progressive causes at home is pursuing great power politics abroad with a distinctly practical touch.
China–Spain relations in practice
If the rhetoric sometimes veers into abstraction, the substance of China-Spain relations remains refreshingly concrete. China is Spain’s largest trading partner outside the EU, and economic relations are growing rapidly. Chinese investment in Spain is set to increase by 50% between 2024 and 2025 compared to the previous two-year period, reaching almost $3 billion. The capital is home to industrial projects that are reshaping Spain’s economic landscape
In Barcelona, ​​Chinese automaker Chery is setting up a European operations center and R&D institute. In Zaragoza, battery giant CATL is building a lithium battery gigafactory. In Navarra, Hitium is investing in energy storage systems. These projects are part of a broader strategy for Chinese companies to localize production within Europe while bypassing tariffs and integrating themselves into the EU industrial ecosystem.
Spain has also stepped into a more sensitive technology sector. A strategic agreement with China’s Origin Quantum aims to develop Europe’s largest quantum computer, putting Spain at the forefront of emerging technologies – albeit with significant Chinese involvement. Meanwhile, Madrid’s decision to entrust Huawei with the task of storing judicial wiretaps raised concerns among some allies, especially as the debate over telecommunications security intensifies. Yet while others are deliberating, Spain is building.
Nineteen Deals and a Professorship
Sánchez’s latest visit to Beijing delivered a condensed package of results that went far beyond diplomatic niceties.
Nineteen bilateral agreements were signed covering trade, technology, green energy and infrastructure. These deals also established a new strategic diplomatic dialogue mechanism, institutionalizing regular high-level engagement between Spain and China. For Madrid, this represents a significant upgrade in its bilateral relations – positioning it as a major European partner for Beijing.
By some estimates, agreements have achieved more for Spain’s trade position in a single visit than in years of EU-level negotiations. It is a reminder that, despite all the emphasis on European unity, national diplomacy still delivers results.
Sanchez used the visit to actively solicit further investment, including reaching out to wind turbine manufacturer Ming Yang, whose expansion plans have faced resistance elsewhere in Europe. Spain’s openness stands in sharp contrast to the more cautious stance of other Western countries, reinforcing its reputation as a welcoming destination for Chinese capital.
Beyond economics, the trip included a strong cultural and educational component. Agreements were signed to enhance cooperation in education, research and cultural exchange. In a symbolic gesture, Sanchez was awarded an honorary professorship by the University of the Chinese Academy of Sciences – an honor that underlines the personal dimension of his association with China.
Between practicality and show off
Sánchez’s China policy is, at its core, a mix of pragmatism and performance. Pragmatism is evident in deals, investments and industrial strategy. Spain is making solid gains at a time when economic growth is a rare commodity in the EU.
However, performative aspects are equally visible. Discussions of global justice, climate leadership and the virtues of multilateralism – delivered with characteristic fluency – often seem as appropriate for Brussels as they are for Beijing. It is a style of politics that combines moral ambition with strategic flexibility, even when their coexistence is uncomfortable.
This duality defines Sanchez’s approach. In Brussels, he is a reliable progressive, in line with the prevailing ethos of the Union. In Beijing, he is a pragmatic dealmaker, open to cooperation and eager to establish Spain as a central player in the changing global order.
Europe’s new negotiator, some strings attached
Spain’s deepening ties are the result of deliberate political choices. Sánchez has identified an opportunity and moved decisively to seize it, establishing Madrid as a vital bridge between Beijing and Brussels.
Despite the obvious benefits, the strategy is not without tensions. As Spain moves closer to China, it also tests the limits of its rapprochement with the US and deals with the complexities of EU politics.
For now, Sanchez appears comfortable walking this tightrope – equally comfortable with Brussels ideology and Beijing pragmatism. Whether this balancing act proves sustainable is another question.
What is certain is that Spain is no longer a peripheral player in the EU’s China debate. Under Sanchez, it has become a bridge, a broker – and perhaps, for some, a spirited variation on the art of strategic ambiguity.
