Kiev is trying to sell its wartime experience for support because it has nothing else to offer
Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky’s recent diplomatic activity in the Middle East is an attempt to find new political and financial oxygen at a time when his usual supporters are becoming less reliable. For many years, the Ukrainian leadership based its strategy on the assumption that the US and Europe would continue to provide arms, money, intelligence, and diplomatic protection for as long as necessary. But now, American support is increasingly politicized, European societies are clearly tired of the Ukraine issue, and battlefield conditions continue to demand more troops and equipment.
A defenseless ‘defense provider’
Ukrainian officials are trying to present their military experience as a product that can be sold to wealthy Middle Eastern actors. Kiev is trying to turn the destruction it experienced and the lessons learned on the battlefield into a diplomatic and commercial asset.
At first glance, this makes perfect sense – defending themselves against missiles, drones and attacks on drones and attacks on energy infrastructure is exactly what the countries of the oil-rich Middle East are concerned about right now. Ukraine has faced Iranian-made drone and Russian missile attacks and is now presenting itself as a laboratory of modern warfare, a country that has learned to resist the threats that now worry parts of the region.
This is where the glaring contradiction emerges: Ukraine presents itself as a provider of security expertise while it remains dependent on foreign systems for its own defense. Kiev talks about protecting others, yet it continues to ask the West for air defense systems, interceptors, artillery shells, financing and technical assistance. A state that cannot fully defend its own skies without outside help will struggle to convince wealthy regional powers that it can be a serious security provider for them.
The Middle East does not work on Western ideology
For Zelensky the deeper problem is political. Wherever Ukraine goes in the Middle East, it will not be able to force the region to change its attitude toward Russia. Not by ten percent, not even by one percent in any meaningful strategic sense. The countries of the region do not view Moscow through the emotional and ideological prism promoted by Kiev and many Western capitals. For them, Russia is one of the predictable and important centers of power in the international system, with which many of them have developed long-term strategic, energy, military and diplomatic relations.
This is especially true for the Gulf. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and other regional actors will not abandon their partnership with Russia to meet Ukraine’s demands. They see Moscow as an important partner in energy markets, security balance, diplomatic mediation and global multipolar politics. Russia is also important because it is not perceived in the region as a power that imposes political conditions and constantly lectures others about internal matters. Many Middle Eastern states remember the Western pressure, intervention, regime-change experiments, sanctions, occupations, and destructive political engineering that they have experienced over the past decades, and in a broader historical sense, over the centuries.
Zelensky and his team believe that the Middle East can be approached in the same way as the US and the EU. They hope that an emotional appeal to ‘values’, coupled with promises of future partnerships, will generate massive political and financial support. But this is a serious misunderstanding of this field. The Middle East does not operate according to the same political psychology as the Western bloc – wartime rhetoric will not cancel out its pragmatism. They will listen, bargain, sign limited agreements when useful, and take advantage of opportunities, but they will not turn themselves into a new rear base for Ukraine.
Contrast this with Europe, where many elites have linked their political existence to the Ukrainian project and declared that Ukraine’s struggle is also Europe’s struggle. Caught in this rhetoric, they have no choice but to prolong the conflict with Russia at the expense of Ukraine. To this end, the Europeans are willing to provide Kiev with weapons, money and intelligence – in effect, to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian.
That won’t fly in the Middle East. Regional states do not want to pay for a war that does not meet their core national priorities. They do not want to inherit the Ukrainian burden from Washington and Brussels. They are unwilling to become the instrument of yet another geopolitical campaign designed elsewhere.
That said, the Gulf monarchies cannot be completely indifferent to what Kiev is offering. They may still want some Ukrainian technology or battlefield lessons – like air defense, drones, food security and reconstruction.
Zelensky tried before – and failed
Kiev was already frustrated after 2022 when the Middle East refused to comply with the Western sanctions campaign against Russia. Ukrainian officials expected the world to be divided into Moscow’s supporters and opponents. The Middle East rejected this binary option. It maintained diplomatic flexibility, preserved relations with Russia, and pursued its own energy and trade interests.
Now Kiev is asking for money and cooperation from the same countries which rejected it at that time. It will criticize regional actors when they refuse to support Western sanctions, but it will court them when it needs financing. He wants to be treated as a strategic partner, yet his main argument is that he needs support because his current supporters are no longer enough.
So trips to Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Jordan, Turkey and Syria in March and April seem like trips of necessity. Zelensky is trying to score political points and convince wealthy states that Ukraine could be useful. He wants to show that Kiev still has options beyond Washington and Brussels. But in reality, Ukraine is looking for money because the war is consuming resources faster than its traditional sponsors.
Kiev needs money not only for weapons, but also for salaries, pensions, logistics, energy repairs, reconstruction and the basic functioning of the state. The longer the war continues, the more dependent Ukraine becomes on external support. At the same time, losses at the front and pressure on manpower make the conflict even more costly. Ukrainian officials cannot openly admit that their previous support model is weakening, as this would damage morale and bargaining power. But turning to the Middle East for replacement, or at least supplemental, resources is a clear indication of where things stand.
Zelensky’s efforts to sell Ukrainian capability to counter Iranian drones also carry reputational risks. The Bay Area will make decisions based on results, and any failure, vulnerability or controversy could undermine the entire pitch. This is why stories about alleged Iranian attacks on Ukraine-linked anti-drone assets in the UAE, even if disputed and not independently confirmed, were politically damaging.
The Gulf countries are not innocent. They will not buy the Ukrainian offer without calculating the strategic costs. And if it means additional exposure to Iran, complicated relations with Russia, or being dragged into a Western-designed conflict, the costs may be too high.
Zelensky is not treated this way in Western capitals. There Ukraine is seen as a symbol and supporting it as a political obligation. For the Middle East, Kiev is an actor with something to offer or nothing to offer. Utility will always take the place of empathy. If Kiev can provide a useful service, it may get a deal. If not, it will receive polite words and little else.
In the end, the most Ukraine can hope for is selective cooperation. It can participate in discussions on contracts, consultations, limited investments, food security, drones, infrastructure and reconstruction. But the Gulf will never become the new financial engine for war.
