NEW YORK, March 31 (IPS) – Trump’s Iran war has devastated the Gulf: US bases turned into targets, economies battered and the myth of the “oasis” destroyed. Gulf rulers now face a strong backlash over their dependence on Washington and their uncertain pursuit of a new, fragile security arrangement.
As Trump amassed major US naval and air assets in the eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and others quietly urged Washington to avoid a full-scale attack on Iran, fearing a direct hit to their territory and energy infrastructure.
Nevertheless, without a clearly defined and publicly expressed political end beyond “crippling” Iran’s capabilities, the US–Israeli air campaign began on February 28, 2026. This disconnect between military buildup and strategic objective is now at the core of Gulf leaders’ anger and sense of betrayal toward Washington.
Trump’s strategic miscalculation
Trump’s decision to launch a joint US-Israeli strike on Iran has created far greater strategic costs than his administration expected, from energy shocks and disrupted shipping to regional fragmentation and anti-American sentiment.
Even though Iranian capabilities have declined significantly, the war has exposed weaknesses in American power projection, destabilized allies and invited more Russian and Chinese diplomatic activism in the Gulf. The long-term “cost” for Washington will be measured less in battlefield metrics than in declining trust and leverage among its traditional Arab partners.
US bases turned into liabilities
From the Gulf perspective, US bases in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates were meant to deter Iran and guarantee the security of the regime; Instead, they became priority targets as soon as the war began. Iran ostensibly conducted its attacks on these facilities as retaliation against Washington, but their location in densely populated and economically important areas meant that nearby civilian infrastructure also suffered severe damage.
This experience is reinforcing the view in Gulf capitals that foreign base systems have languished for decades without providing credible security.
a nightmare come true
Gulf leaders have long warned that war with Iran would destroy their security and economy, a nightmare that has now come true as Iranian missiles and drones have targeted oil facilities, ports, power plants and cities across the region. He blamed Washington for launching the campaign and Israel for pressuring Iran to “neutralize” it without regard to collateral damage in neighboring Arab states.
The feeling in Gulf capitals is that their caution was overruled, while they have paid a disproportionate price in the form of physical destruction, economic shocks, disrupted exports and increased domestic anxiety.
Shattered Oasis Story
The image of Gulf countries such as Dubai, Doha and Riyadh as “oasis” open for business, tourism and investment has been badly damaged by missile alerts, attacks on ports and airports and the closure of major sea routes.
Restoring confidence will require visible reconstruction, increased civilian protection, improved air and missile defenses, and credible diplomacy that reduces the perceived risk of another sudden war. Investors and tourists will demand evidence that the region can manage not only high-level events and mega-projects, but also Iran-related tensions.
Trump’s misunderstanding of Iran tensions
Trump publicly argued that overwhelming force would immediately coerce Iran and trigger regime change while fighting “over there,” yet it appears he did not anticipate the enormity of Iranian retaliation against neighboring Gulf states or the prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
The IRGC’s effective closure of the strait, including attacks and threats against commercial shipping, has caused global energy shocks and exposed the fragility of US planning assumptions. For Gulf leaders, it underlined how inadequate Washington’s war planning was to take into account second- and third-order consequences.
deliberate decision not to retaliate
Despite the heavy damage, Gulf rulers have so far avoided direct retaliation against Iran, anticipating that further action would expose their cities and infrastructure to even more punitive attacks. Publicly, they emphasize restraint and international law, but privately, officials acknowledge their enduring geographic reality: They will have to co-exist with a powerful and close Iran long after this US-led campaign ends.
By keeping their fire under control, they hope to secure space to de-escalate tensions after the war and avoid being locked into a permanent state of open conflict.
Rearranging security arrangements with Washington
Given their limited strategic options, the Gulf monarchies are unlikely to break ties with Washington, but they will seek more conditional, transactional security arrangements. They are pressing for clearer US commitments on the defense of their region, better integration of regional missile defense and greater authority over decisions that could trigger Iranian retaliation.
At the same time, they would hedge by deepening ties with China, Russia, Europe, and Asian energy importers, thereby reducing exclusive dependence on the US while maintaining the US security umbrella.
Gulf option to prevent future conflicts
To prevent a recurrence, Gulf countries are also exploring limited de-escalation channels with Tehran, strict regional crisis hotlines and revitalized maritime security arrangements that include non-Western actors such as China and India. They could push for new rules of engagement around energy infrastructure and shipping lanes, seeking informal understandings that keep these limits at bay even in a crisis.
Internally, they are reevaluating missile defense, strengthening critical facilities, and considering more diverse export routes that reduce dependence on Hormuz. Neither of these options is completely convincing, but together they provide partial risk reduction.
Possibilities of normalization with Iran
Speculation about full normalization, including a non-belligerent agreement, between Iran and the Gulf states builds on pre-war trends of cautious dialogue and economic engagement. Whether this is actually “in action” depends on the outcomes of the war, Iran’s internal politics, and Gulf threat perceptions: if Tehran’s regime survives but remains hostile, the Gulf states will likely revert to hedging – a combination of deterrence, limited engagement, and access to outside powers.
A more pragmatic Iranian leadership could make structured security arrangements and phased confidence-building measures more plausible over time.
no return to status quo ante
The Gulf states will not return to the pre-war status quo; Instead, they are likely to pursue a more diverse security architecture combining a thin US shield with expanded relationships with China, Russia and Asian importers. This shift would gradually weaken Washington’s centrality in Gulf security, complicating US military posture and the perception of automatic Arab support for Israel against Iran.
For Israel, a more cautious, risk-averse Gulf may limit direct strategic alignment, while for the US, enduring mistrust will make coalition-building for future crises more difficult.
Trump’s Iran adventurism is not an isolated mistake, but the latest and perhaps most explosive expression of his assault on an already fragile global order. By abandoning restraint, sidelining allies, and weaponizing American power for short-term political gain, he has hastened the erosion of American credibility, fractured Western alliances, and opened up new strategic space for Russia and China. The Gulf states are the latest casualties of this disorder: their cities battered, economies shaken, and security assumptions shattered.
What comes out of this war will not be a restoration of the status quo, but a more fragmented, unstable Middle East in which Israel and the United States will face less margin for error and a much narrower circle of willing, trustworthy partners.
Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a retired professor of international relations, most recently at the Center for Global Affairs at New York University (NYU). He taught courses on international negotiations and Middle Eastern studies.
(email protected)
IPS UN Bureau
© Inter Press Service (20260331043757) – All rights reserved. Original source: Inter Press Service
