Opinion – In the private sector, we analyze competitors to understand where they excel, so that we can improve our approach. With this mindset, I reviewed how 15 opposition groups use media to communicate locally and internationally.
The headline is that groups ranging from al-Shabaab to ISIS-K to Hezbollah are apparently learning from each other, creating an informal universal playbook that is consistent across all groups.
It is quite similar to the private sector where innovation is an iterative race. We have a tendency to copy what works.
Let’s take a look at these common behaviors by breaking them down into media strategy and narrative style.
media strategy
Telegram is home base. It’s the top distribution channel for a reason. Telegram offers subscribers no limits on broadcast channels, bots for automation, end-to-end encrypted direct messages, minimal content moderation, and easy migration after restrictions through invitation links. Stories often start in Telegram, then the content is posted on other platforms.
Each group has a similar distribution strategy that anticipates content removal. Groups distribute content simultaneously on an average of 3-7 platforms. Knowing that removal will occur, they also upload the content to Archive.org, which acts as a holding tank. If content is moved to a social channel, it can be re-uploaded from Archive.org. Examples of media mix might include Telegram, Facebook, TikTok, Elementor, and Archive.org.
Two tier distribution system. All groups have two tiers of distribution – their official channels for direct distribution and unofficial channels for supporters/surrogates (TikTok, Instagram, YouTube) to reshare and amplify the content. Supporters help groups maintain a presence despite official account restrictions. Platform policies have difficulties in actively monitoring and patrolling the surrogate amplification layer.
Enforcement leads to migration. Each group pre-positions itself on other channels, such as Rocket.Chat, Element, and Session so that they can more easily activate pre-existing presence in alternative channels or they move into new channels beyond the reach of platform moderation, such as satellite TV (Hezbollah, Houthis) and physical offline media (JI, Boko Haram).
descriptive style
Groups are experts at setting up a false narrative. It is a standing protocol to take advantage of major geopolitical events by quickly submitting their statements within a few hours. If they do this type of “narrative jacking” within 2-4 hours of the event they have a chance to lead the first wave of interpretation before the mainstream media can establish the dominant structure.
Video intensifies claims of attack. Each group releases an official video within hours of any attack. Pre-built, officially branded with logo, first released on Telegram. Sets the frame and it’s often more emotional.
Specializing in parallel audience messaging. Local messaging is in the local language and often focuses on the legitimacy or grievance of the regime. The international message focuses on solidarity, victimhood and a humanitarian framework. Dual-narrative analysis would be more instructive than single tracking.
The ability to reframe the civic imagination. The footage is often authentic. The deception is in the attribution, framing or claimed scale.
Expansion of grievance is the gateway to radicalism. Media strategy often begins by amplifying legitimate grievances – real injustices, real conflicts, civil suffering. Extreme content rises to the top over time, and because the base is anecdotal, platform policies typically do not flag it.
Overall, if we understand how groups learn from each other, our ability to identify which media, technology, and AI trends are being used by any given group is improved. We know that what breaks new ground will be analyzed and implemented as quickly as possible.
The implications for any counter-messaging team are practical. To see one group’s innovation is to see all fifteen. The right question to ask inside your own operation is whether you are monitoring the first mover in the playbook – not just a group of your assigned target list.
Note: The groups analyzed include ISIS, al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab, Boko Haram/ISWAP, Taliban, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Hezbollah, Hamas, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, AQAP, ISIS-K, Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf Group, Jaish-e-Mohammed/Lashkar-e-Taiba, Houthis.
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