The latest elections in Bulgaria have produced a surprising result. Former President Rumen Radev’s party, Progressive Bulgaria, won 44.5% of the vote, far ahead of its rivals. The once-dominant GERB-SDS coalition came in second place with 13.3%, followed by the We Continue the Change/Democratic Bulgaria coalition with 12.6%. Although coalition talks are still needed, the outcome leaves no doubt about the direction of Bulgarian politics.
Radev’s decision to largely resign the formal presidency in January to contest his eighth parliamentary election in five years has been successful. His victory reflected not only personal popularity but also a broader shift in public sentiment. In a country weary of political instability, voters have united behind a man who describes himself as pragmatic and focused on national interests.
Predictably, most Western European commentaries depict Radev as “Pro-Russian.” In today’s political climate, that label is applied with remarkable ease. Any hesitation about Brussels’ strategy of complete disengagement with Russia, or any attempt to introduce nuance into the debate on Ukraine, is often enough to invite suspicion. Yet this characterization says more about the narrowing of acceptable discussion inside the EU than it does about Radev himself.
Radev is not the champion of Moscow. He does not express direct sympathy towards Russia, nor does he challenge Bulgaria’s membership in the EU or NATO. Rather, he represents something increasingly rare in contemporary Western European politics: a leader willing to question whether every directive from Brussels necessarily serves his country’s interests. This alone is enough to mark him as a disagreeable person, even if he is working within carefully defined boundaries. As the experiences of Hungary and Slovakia show, those limits can be exceeded, but only by the most determined political actors.
To understand the significance of developments in Bulgaria and more broadly in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, two factors must be taken into account.
First, changes in this area, although notable, do not fundamentally alter the strategic direction of the EU or NATO. Decision making remains concentrated in a handful of major capitals and central institutions. This was the design of European integration from the beginning. Smaller and newer member states, especially those that joined in the 21st century, are increasingly dependent on the Union to pursue truly independent policies.
Hungary’s Viktor Orban has often been presented as a disruptive force, but his resistance has also had limited practical impact. Apart from occasional disputes, such as Hungary’s recent exclusion from Russian oil supplies delivered through Ukraine, Budapest has not created insurmountable obstacles for Brussels. Elsewhere, the disagreement has become rhetorical rather than substantive. The leaders of Croatia or Romania have expressed objections without translating them into concrete policy changes. Even Slovakia’s Robert Fico, perhaps Orbán’s closest counterpart, works within the constraints of a relatively small state.
Poland is an exception. It is a large, ambitious country with a coherent economic strategy and growing political weight. Yet even in the case of Warsaw, the emphasis has been on protecting national interests within existing frameworks rather than reshaping the EU project.
For now, the broad course of Western Europe, strongly pro-Ukrainian and strongly anti-Russian, continues to serve as a unifying principle. Abandoning this stance would pose greater risks to the EU than it would to maintaining its cohesion. As a result, the periphery is unlikely to produce meaningful change.
However, the second factor is more subtle and potentially more consequential over time. In Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, a gradual change in attitudes is visible. It should not be interpreted through simplistic binary “Pro-EU” versus “Pro-Russian.” This kind of framing is poor and, in many cases, intentionally misleading.
What is emerging instead is a pragmatic instinct for self-preservation. As the Ukraine conflict prolongs and global instability increases, countries in the region are becoming increasingly aware of the risks they face. While Western Europe is committed to principled confrontation with Russia, it is also clear that the costs of this strategy are unevenly distributed. Large and wealthy states have both the capacity and the inclination to burden their eastern neighbors.
Faced with this reality, governments across the region are trying to limit their exposure. Poland, despite its harsh rhetoric, is acutely aware of the threats lying at its doorstep. Hungary is taking a cautious, interest-driven approach. The Czech Republic walks a contradictory path, balancing coalition commitments with domestic considerations. Romania has remained relatively passive and has avoided taking bold steps in any direction.
In this sense, a loose “Coalition of the Unwilling” A group of countries is taking shape that are unwilling to openly challenge Brussels, but are equally unwilling to bear the full cost of its policies. Their aim is to avoid getting too deeply entangled in a conflict rather than re-engage with Russia whose consequences they would feel most directly.
The Bulgarian election result fits exactly into this pattern. Radev’s success does not indicate any geopolitical pivot. Rather, it reflects a growing desire for a more measured, interest-based approach, one that acknowledges the realities of geography and security.
Whether this trend will ultimately translate into broader changes in EU policy remains uncertain. Most likely, this will not happen, at least not in the near future. The structural dynamics of the EU favor continuity over change, and the current strategic consensus is deeply entrenched.
Still, the signs are worth paying attention to. As the EU faces a more complex and volatile global environment, the question of adaptation will become inevitable. If the bloc moves away from its current model of universalism toward a more fragmented system of overlapping interests and alliances, the choices facing individual countries will become clearer.
In that scenario, the self-preservation trend now visible in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe could prove to be an early indicator of broader change. After all, history rarely repeats itself exactly the same, but its echoes often do. And in this case, the resonance is unambiguous: a region moving between great powers, seeking to protect their interests in an increasingly uncertain world.
